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Abstract
We use a laboratory experiment to test the impacts of uncertainty, the magnitude of nes and aversion
against making type-I and type-II errors on legal decision making. Measuring uncertainty as the noise of
a signal on the defendant's guilt observed by legal decision makers, we observe that a supposed wrongdoer
is less likely to be punished if nes and uncertainty are high. Furthermore, judges care far more about
type-I errors and violators steal far less often than expected payo maximizers would. While our results
support the theoretical predictions on average, a cluster analysis provides evidence for heterogenous
behavior of participants, many of whom don't respond to changes in the parameters or are far more
driven by uncertainty than the magnitude of nes.
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1 Introduction
Two fundamental insights of the economic analysis of law are that deterrence is increasing in the magnitude
of nes (Becker, 1968) and the accuracy of the court system (Png, 1986, Polinsky and Shavell, 1999). For
the latter point, it has been noted that both higher frequencies of convicting innocent defendants (type-I
errors) and higher percentages of releasing guilty defendants (type-II errors) have detrimental eects as the
incentives to obey the law depend on the dierence in the expected ne with and without violating the law.
The deterrence eect of higher nes is straightforward when type-I and type-II errors are exogenously
given, which is usually assumed in the literature.1 In reality, however, the frequencies of these two error types
do not only depend on the evidence and the accuracy of the court system, but also on the relative weights
judges and juries put on them: For a given quality of evidence, which is a noisy signal on the suspects' actual
behavior, legal decision makers can reduce type-I errors at the expense of higher type-II errors and vice versa.
Intuitively, one would expect that the legal decision makers' aversion against making type-I errors increases
in the ne size, and if this eect is strong enough, then higher actual punishment may even decrease expected
punishment (Andreoni, 1991). Understanding the impact of the ne size on the relative frequency of type-I
and type-II errors is hence a crucial point for the proper design of legal punishment.
Based on a model that structures the potential eects at work, we perform a laboratory experiment
to analyze the interplay of legal uncertainty, represented by the precision of a noisy signal on the actual
behavior, and the magnitude of nes in impacting on punishment and violation. Participants are divided
into two groups, potential violators and judges. Both groups are informed that there is a xed amount of
money supposed to be donated to charity. The money can be stolen by the violators. If it is not stolen,
it may still disappear due to a random event, and this creates legal uncertainty. Judges can punish if and
only if they observe that the money has disappeared, and we vary both the level of nes and the degree
of uncertainty. Note that the frequencies of type-I and type-II errors are endogenously determined by the
judges' and potential violators' decisions, so that their interdependency is fully captured by our experiment.
Turning to our results, let us start with judges. First, we indeed nd that the frequency of type-I errors
relative to type-II errors decreases in the magnitude of nes. Thus, there is a countervailing eect on the
1See the overview in Polinsky and Shavell (2009), section 15.
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deterrence eect of large nes, caused by the decision makers' lower willingness to accept type-I errors.
Second, it is important to understand the relative weight judges put on type-I and type-II errors. This
requires to take the actual consequences of misjudgments into account. We do so by using the nes imposed
on innocents as a measure of the preference cost of making type-I errors, and the amount stolen by an
unpunished violator as a measure of the preference cost of type-II errors. Comparing these amounts, we nd
that judges care far more about type-I than type-II errors, that is, they are more concerned about unjustied
nes than about unatoned thefts.
For potential violators, we rst nd that the signal's noise turns out to be even more important than
the magnitude of nes. Thus, our experiment reinforces the view that accurate decisions are crucial for the
incentives to obey the law. Second, violators care more about their own money than about the money for
donation, but they have (partially) social preferences or are averse against violating social norms. Given the
punishment behavior of judges, stealing the money increases the expected payo of potential violators for
all of our combinations of nes and uncertainty, so that risk-neutral participants who do not care about the
donation should always steal. This is contrasted by an overall stealing rate of around 55% in our experiment.
In summary, the participants' behaviour that we observe on average conrms our theoretical model's
results. However, individual behaviour is very heterogenous. Indeed, performing a cluster analysis yields
some additional insights into it: For instance, about 25% of judges and thieves respond far more to changes
in uncertainty than to changes in nes. Moreover, another 25% of them don't respond at all to changes in
nes and uncertainty. However, a closer look at these latter clusters reveals that 20% of judges never punish
while only 4% punish in all cases, which is consistent with a far stronger aversion against type-I errors than
against type-II errors.
Most of the experimental literature on deterrence has restricted attention to situations where not only the
nes, but also the punishment probabilities are exogenously given. DeAngelo and Charness (2012) design an
experiment where the expected ne is kept constant, while the probability of being punished and the uncer-
tainty on this probability varies. They nd that higher uncertainty enhances deterrence. Schildberg-Horisch
and Strassmair (2012) nd that small sanctions reduce deterrence compared to no sanctions, which can be
attributed to a crowding out of intrinsic motivation for socially appreciated behavior. While some individ-
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uals act selshly and reduce their criminal rate even for small sanctions, the majority of the participants
responds in the expected direction only for large sanctions. Khadjavi (2014) conrms a path-dependency
of the impact of nes known from experiments on rewards: When nes have a deterrence eect and are
removed later on, then the pro-social behavior is lower compared to a situation with no nes at all. By using
questionnaires on the participants' feelings, they can explain the observed behavior by a change in emotions.
Rizzolli and Stanca (2012) nd in the laboratory that, for identical incentives in case of selsh preferences,
type I-errors have a larger adverse eect on deterrence than type II-errors.
The experimental papers on punishments which emerge endogenously from the behavior of the partic-
ipants have adopted voluntary contribution mechanisms (VCMs) in which the participants can mutually
sanction non-cooperative behavior (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). For our research question, however, a dierent
setting seems appropriate: First, legal nes are better resembled by third-party punishment, where those
who can punish are not directly aected by the behavior of violators.2 Second, we assume that nes are
costless for those who impose them, since judges themselves do not bear the social costs of punishment.
Third, VCM games are, by denition, about voluntary payments, whereas we frame our experiment as a
legal infringement by denoting the taking of the money provided for donation explicitly as theft.3
There are only a few VCM experiments with punishment which assume noisy signals or vary the magni-
tude of nes. Grechening et al. (2010) assume that participants get noisy signals on their mutual contribu-
tions in a VCM game and nd that higher noise, which increases the risk of type-I errors in case of penalties,
does not reduce the punishment frequency. Social welfare, however, shrinks due to retaliation of those who
are innocently punished and because nes are costly.
While nes are kept constant in Grechening et al. (2010), Ambrus and Greiner (2012) consider dierent
ne levels. With low nes, people do not punish often, thereby saving on punishment costs. When nes
are high, then there is a large deterrence eect which improves social eciency. As both of these benecial
eects are small for intermediate levels of punishment, eciency is U-shaped in the magnitude of nes. This
is related to results in Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008), which seem to be the
2One of the few papes applying third-party punishment is Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). but they assume that the behavior
can be perfectly observed.
3While Rega and Telle (2004) nd that a terminology that relates contributions to social norms has no impact on behavior,
this may be dierent for dictions related to stealing.
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rst experiments on the impact of ne sizes on punishments and contributions in VCM settings. We are not
aware of any other paper in which probabilities for type-I and II-errors are determined endogenously by the
violators' actual behavior.
Other interesting results of VCM experiments that are, however, not directly related to variations in the
noisy signal or the magnitude of sanctions include that violations of social norms are reinforcing (Falk and
Fischbacher, 2002), that group decisions on punishments yield higher contributions (Ertan et al., 2009, and
Casari and Luini, 2009), that revealing the identities of non-contributors increases cooperation (Masclet et
al., 2003, and Rega and Telle, 2004) and that the deterrence eect of punishment declines sharply when
counter-punishments are feasible (Nikiforakis, 2008). Bornstein and Weisel (2010) show that uncertainty
about the counterparts' endowments reduces the benets from the punishment option in a repeated VCM
setting.
From a legal perspective, our nding that participants in the role of judges put considerably more weight
on type-I errors compared to type-II errors is related to the famous Blackstone ratio that it is "better that
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suers". Most people share the view that avoiding type-I
errors matters most, but the marginal rate of substitution diers substantially among them (Volokh, 1997).
To account for the Blackstone ratio, some models simply put higher weight on type-I errors in analyzing
optimal judgements (Miceli, 1991, Lando, 2006), and several papers explain from a rational choice perspective
why type-I errors are more severe for society (see Hylton and Khanna, 2007, who take up a public-choice
perspective, and Persson and Siven, 2007, who adopt a median-voter model). By using a reversed dictator
game where participants can steel from their counterparts' endowments, Rizzolli and Saraceno (2013) show
experimentally that the adverse eects of type-I errors on deterrence are higher than those of type-II errors.
Finally, the starting point of our paper that higher nes may even reduce deterrence dates back to the
early legal literature on nullication pioneered by Michael and Wechsler (1937). This literature argues that
jurors or witnesses may not be willing to participate in legal action when punishments seem unfairly high,
and theoretical models show that higher nes reduce deterrence when the willingness to accept type-I errors
is decreasing in nes to a suciently large extent (Andreoni, 1991, Feess and Wohlschlegel, 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical model on the
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interdependency of the judges' and the potential violators' decisions. We show that the impacts of the
signal's noise and the magnitude of nes on deterrence, and on the frequency of type-I and type-II errors in
equilibrium, is not straightforward. In section 3, we describe the experimental setting. Section 4 provides
descriptive statistics, and section 5 extends to regression analysis. Section 6 discusses the heterogeneity in
the participants' behavior. We conclude in section 7.
2 A simple model of punishment and deterrence
We rst develop a model that allows to analyze the impact of ne size and uncertainty on the interplay
between punishment and deterrence. In basic models on errors in court (Png, 1986, Polinsky and Shavell,
1999), it is found that both type-I and type-II errors increase the violation frequency as the dierence between
the probability of being punished with and without violation shrinks. A full-edged equilibrium analysis,
however, needs to take into account that higher uncertainty and higher nes may reduce the decision makers'
(judges or juries) willingness to punish, so that the relative probabilities for the two errors need to be derived
endogenously.
The interdependency of the behavior of judges and violators implies that we cannot treat type-I and type-
II errors as exogenous - the probability of convicting an innocent (type-I error) depends on the percentage of
violators in equilibrium, which in turn depends on the (anticipated) punishment behavior of judges. Consider
a potential violator who, in the case of an infringement, causes an adverse outcome (a 'loss') denoted by
L.4 In case of no infringement, an exogenous event causes the same loss L with probability q. Thus, we
assume that the loss can occur only once; if the money is already stolen by the violator, it can't disappear
for exogenous reasons any more.5 In our experiment, observing L means that the money has disappeared,
and q is the probability that this happens even in cases where it is not taken by the respective participant.
With  as the percentage of participants who actually commit the act, the ex post probability that a
violation took place after observing the loss is +(1 )q , and the ex post probability of no infringement is
(1 )q
+(1 )q . Thus,  =
(1 )q
+(1 )q is the probability of committing a type-I error in case of punishment, while
4In our experimental design, this is the amount donated to charity.
5As in all models on errors in court, we need to assume that the facts of the case cannot be fully reconstrcuted ex post.
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1   = +(1 )q is the probability of a type-II error in case of no punishment.
For judges, we introduce the following assumptions: First, we set the utility from correct decisions to
zero, that is, we take only the preference costs of misjudgments, but not the benets of correct decisions into
account. Second, we assume that the disutility from type-I errors is iF where i is a parameter on judge
i's aversion against type-I errors, and F is the ne size. Third, the disutility from type-II errors is iA where
i is the degree of judge i's aversion against type-II errors, and A the severity of the infringement which we
will refer to as the "amount stolen". Normalizing i = 1, i captures the ratio of the degrees of aversion
against type-I and type-II errors.
Recalling the probabilities of type-I and type-II errors, it follows that a judge i who assumes a violation
frequency  prefers to convict a suspect if and only if
(1  ) q
+ (1  ) qiF 

+ (1  ) qA. (1)
Dening e as the threshold type such that a judge prefers punishment for all   e, we get
e = A
Fq (1  ) . (2)
For potential violators, we dene mj as the weight that a potential violator j puts on the victim's payo
relative to her own payo. For mj = 0, violator j is completely selsh, and for mj = 1, she puts equal weight
on the victim's and her own payo.
If individual j assumes punishment frequency p, she steals if and only if
A  pF  mjA  qpF : (3)
On the left hand side, the expected benet is the dierence in the amount stolen and the expected ne.
On the right hand side, mjA is the utility associated with the donation,
6 and qp is the probability of being
6Identically, we could express A (1 mi) as the utility from stealing amount A where mi captures the degree of disutility
from violating a social norm.
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punished by mistake (type-I error). Thus, we get
em = 1  Fp(1  q)
A
(4)
as threshold such that individual j violates if and only if mj  em.
Equations (2) and (4) characterize the judges' and violators' optimal decisions based on their expectations
on their counterparts' behavior: Inspecting these two equations yields the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that violators treat the punishment frequency p, and judges the violation frequency
, as exogenously given. Then:
(i) @ em@p =  F (1 q)A < 0, @ em@F =  p(1 q)A < 0, and @ em@q = FpA > 0 and
(ii) @e@ = AFq(1 )2 > 0, @e@F =   AF 2q(1 ) < 0, and @e@q =   AFq2(1 ) < 0.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 rst conrms the well-known deterrence theory: Violators are less likely to
violate if they anticipate a higher punishment probability p and a larger ne size F . Furthermore, the
violation frequency increases in q, that is, in the probability that the loss may also be observed without
infringement. This resembles the literature on the impacts of errors in court discussed in the introduction.
Part (ii) discusses judges' behavioral responses to the model parameters when they seek to minimize
expected preference costs from wrong decisions: When they anticipate violators to break the law more
frequently, when the evidence on the actual punishment is less noisy, and when nes are low, then judges
will also punish for higher aversion against type-I errors, so that e increases. In a way, @ em@p characterizes
how violators' best responses depend on the judges' punishment frequency as, for any given p, a potential
violator steals if and only if m  em. Similarly, @e@ captures the eect of the anticipated violating frequency
on judges' best responses. While these individual best responses are intuitive, things are more involved
when we take the interdependency of the decisions into account. In Bayesian Nash equilibrium, judges' and
violators' expectations about their counterparts' actions coincide with their actual equilibrium choices, i.e.,
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punishment and violation frequencies are given by the system of equations
p = G (e) (5)
 = H (em) ; (6)
where G(:) and H(:) denote the cumulative distribution functions of judges' parameter  of relative aversion
against type-I errors and potential violators' marginal rate of substitution m between the victim's and their
own monetary payo, provided that the thresholds e and em are in the supports S of G(:) and Sm of H(:),
respectively, the intersection of which determines the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of noise and the ne size on equilibrium punishment
and violation frequencies, where judges and violators correctly anticipate their counterparts' equilibrium
choices:
Proposition 2 Suppose that S and Sm are intervals. If e 2 S and em 2 Sm, then the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium has the following comparative static properties:
(i) For all distributions G() and H(), dpdF < 0 and d

dq > 0.
(ii) Independently of the distribution H(), ddF is negative (positive, zero) if G () is concave (convex,
linear).
(iii) dp

dq < 0 if and only if
p
(1 )2h(em) < e.
Part (i) of the Proposition shows that, for all distributions of the judges' and the potential violators'
preferences, two of the results derived for given behavior of the counterparts carry over to the Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium: The punishment frequency decreases in the magnitude of nes, and the violation frequency
increases in the probability that the loss occurs even without violation.
The fact that these two results carry over to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is intuitive. Let us start
with the rst result in part (i) of the Proposition, dp

dF < 0: For all adjustments of the violators' behavior,
the consequences of a type-I error are increasing in the ne size, so that judges are also, in equilibrium, more
reluctant to punish in case of high nes. At the same time, however, part (ii) of the Proposition states that
8
it cannot be taken for granted that Becker's classical result concerning the deterrence eect of higher nes
holds when violators anticipate the degree at which the judges' willingness to punish decreases in F . If this
eect is so strong that the expected ne decreases, then the violation frequency increases in the ne level.
Hence, part (ii) of Proposition 2 conrms the results of Andreoni (1991) and Feess and Wohlschlegel
(2009) that higher nes may reduce deterrence if judges care suciently much about type I errors. However,
our result goes one step further by identifying the distribution of judges' preferences over type I and type II
errors as the driving force of this result, whereas it does not depend at all on the distribution of potential
violators' aversion to stealing. To see the impact of the distribution of the judges' preferences, note that a
convex distribution function G () means that there is high probability mass on large , i.e. many judges
put high weight on type-I errors. And since a higher F reduces the critical threshold e, many judges do
not punish for high  when G () is convex. In these cases, the indirect eect of the higher ne size via the
lower punishment probability outweighs the direct eect, so that the incentive to obey the law decreases in
the ne level.
We now turn to the second result in part (i) of the Proposition, d

dq > 0. This means that the standard
result that higher uncertainty reduces deterrence carries over from the setting with exogenously given errors
in court to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which judges' responses to higher uncertainty depend on
their preferences. While the impact on violators is hence clear-cut, the impact on the judges' punishment
frequency is ambiguous. Moreover, the impact cannot be traced back to general properties of the distribution
functions, but rather depends on both equilibrium thresholds, e and em.
Summing up, in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, judges respond to the ne size and potential violators
to uncertainty in the intuitive way (i.e. in the same direction as naive decision makers do), but the impact
of F on the stealing frequency and of q on the punishment behavior are ambiguous.
3 Experimental design
We conducted eight sessions with a total of 192 subjects in the AIX laboratory for empirical economic studies
at RWTH Aachen University. The participants consisted of 119 males and 73 females with an average age
of 25 years in the range of 18 to 62 years. Sessions were conducted in September and October 2013 and were
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computerized using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). On average, a session lasted approximately one
hour with an average payment of 12 Euro (16US$ at the time of the experiment), including a show up fee of
4 Euro. We used ECU as the currency for the experiment with an exchange rate of 75 ECU = 0.1 Euro. A
translation of the originally German instructions is provided in Appendix 2. Participants played two dierent
roles and were informed that both parts are paid out which we did in order to avoid potentially negative
(or very low) amounts for those who are innocently punished. Since we gave no feedback between the two
rounds and because judges receive a xed income anyway, there are no concerns about income eects.
The experimental design proceeds closely along the lines of the model. Participants were randomly
assigned to their roles as judges (group 1) or potential violators (group 2). Then, pairs of two anonymous
participants, with one judge and one potential violator each, were formed. In each role, participants got a
xed amount of 2400 ECU which was mainly done to avoid high negative payos for those who do not steal
in their role as potential violators but who are nevertheless punished. All participants were informed that,
for each member of group 2, we provide a donation of 2400 ECU to the German charity 'Brot fur die Welt ',
which is organized by the federation of Protestant regional church bodies in Germany, and mainly funds
projects of capacity development in developing countries. The money meant for donation can be stolen by
the respective member of group 2. In this case, the 2400 ECU will not be donated but are instead transferred
to the account of the thief which hence increases from 2400 to 4800 ECU. The 2400 ECU that can be stolen
resemble the amount A from our model. We deliberately framed the experiment as a violation of social
norms by using the terms "donation", "stealing" and "ne".
All participants were informed that judges observe whether the 2400 ECU are available for donation or
not, but that there is a probability of q that the money disappears even in case it is not stolen. Judges
can impose exogenously given nes of F if and only if the money is not disposable for donation. In the
instructions, we emphasized some features of the experiment: the meaning of q, that the money will in fact
be donated, and that all features of the game are common knowledge. As this might aect their behavior,
participants were not informed that they act in both roles. Of course, we controlled for order eects.
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In the experiment itself, we provided the following nine combinations of q and F :
Table 1. q   F matrix
q/F 1200 2400 4800
10%
50%
90%
Before we started the actual experiment, we posed several control questions concerning the calculation
of the payos. The members of both groups were then asked to make their decisions by indicating for each
of the nine cells in table 1 whether they want to steal or punish, respectively. Subsequently, a second round
was played with opposite roles, again by forming random pairs of judges and potential violators. Between
the two rounds, no decisions or payos were conveyed. Finally, we distributed a personality questionnaire
and a form with questions on the reasons for the decisions made. The latter form showed that participants
had no problems in understanding the experiment.
4 Descriptive statistics
Judges. Since each of the 192 participants made nine decisions as judge and as violator each, we have, over
all, 192  2  9 = 3456 observations. Starting with judges, table 2 shows the distribution of punishments for
the nine combinations of the signal's noise represented by q and ne sizes F . For each combination of q and
F , we rst show the absolute number of punishments. The second line shows percentages. The number in
the third line is a measure of judges' incentives to punish given that they correctly anticipate thieves' actual
reactions to the combinations of q and F , and is calculated as  
(1 )q
+(1 )qF

+(1 )qA
= (1 )FqA .
7 The numerator
is the probability of a type-I error, multiplied by the ne, and hence the unjustied expected ne if a judge
punishes. Similarly, the denominator is the expected amount that has been stolen unatoned in case of no
punishment. Both terms are calculated for the actual behavior of potential violators.  can be interpreted
7For instance, given that 62.5% of violators steal in the case of q = 50% and F = 1200, the probability of a type-I error
when punishing is 0:3750:5
0:3750:5+0:625  0:23. The expected unjustied ne in case of punishment is thus about 0:23  1200 = 276,
whereas the expected unatoned stolen amount in case of no-punishment is about

1  0:3750:5
0:3750:5+0:625

 2400  1846, the ratio
of which is around 0:15.
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as the ratio in the expected undesired monetary consequences with and without punishment. Recall that
we dened  as the relative weight a judge puts on type-I compared to type-II errors, so that a judge who
correctly anticipates  will punish if and only if   1 .
In the fourth line, we multiply  by p1 p to get the ratio of judges' expected costs of punishment and
no-punishment based on the actual frequencies of each choice. Note carefully that  refers to the decision
of a single judge, while  p1 p is the ratio of the undesired monetary consequences of both types of error,
aggregated over the actual decisions of all judges.
Table 2. Punishment behavior of judges (p)
F=1200 F=2400 F=4800 Average
q=10%
Frequency 81 84 84 83
Percentage 42% 44% 44% 43%
 0.04 0.09 0.36 0.17
Ratio of expected costs 0.03 0.07 0.28 0.13
q=50%
Frequency 81 87 39 69
Percentage 42% 45% 20% 36%
 0.15 0.26 1.26 0.55
Ratio of expected costs 0.11 0.21 0.32 0.21
q=90%
Frequency 56 40 47 48
Percentage 29% 21% 24% 25%
 0.24 0.60 1.56 0.80
Ratio of expected costs 0.10 0.16 0.50 0.25
Average
Frequency 73 70 57 67
Percentage 38% 37% 30% 35%
 0.14 0.32 1.06 0.51
Ratio of expected costs 0.08 0.15 0.37 0.20
A rst observation from table 2 is that the overall punishment frequency is rather low (35% over all nine
situations) which provides preliminary evidence that judges care more about type-I errors than about type-II
errors.
Turning to the impact of our primary model parameters, noise and nes, on judges' decisions, we start
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with considering the impact of the ne size F . Recall from Proposition 2 that the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
predicts that the punishment frequency decreases in F . Remarkably, table 2 shows that judges only slightly
respond to dierent ne sizes: considering the averages taken over all levels of q, the punishment frequency
is 38% for F = 1200, 37% for F = 2400 and 30% for F = 4800. The Wilcoxon rank sum test shows that
the punishment frequency for F = 4800 diers from the one for the other two ne levels signicantly at the
5%-level, but the size eect is moderate.
Our model predicts that the punishment frequency decreases in q when judges treat the violation fre-
quency as exogenous, (Proposition 1), but that the impact of q depends on the models' parameters in the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (Proposition 2). Results are perfectly in line with Proposition 1: On average,
the punishment frequencies are 43% for q = 10%, 36% for q = 50% and 25% for q = 90%, with all dierences
signicant at the 5%-level when performing a Fisher Exact test. However, the dierence between q = 10%
and q = 50% is exclusively driven by the highest ne level, but insignicant for the two lower ne levels.
Now recall that the numbers in the third line are the ratios of the expected undesired monetary con-
sequences with and without punishment, calculated as  = (1 )FqA . Overall, we see that the expected
monetary consequences from type-I errors are lower for seven out of the nine cases, and higher only for
F = 4800 combined with q = 50% and q = 90%. Interestingly, these are in fact two of the cases where the
punishment frequencies are lowest, i.e. the observed behavior is compatible with the hypothesis that judges
adjust their punishment behavior to the dierences in the expected monetary consequences of the two error
types.
The numbers in the fourth line show that judges indeed put far higher weight on type-I compared to
type-II errors. On average, we observe  p1 p = 0:20 which means that, given the behavior of thieves and
judges, the undesired monetary consequences of type-II errors are on average ve times higher than those of
type-I errors. Hence, many judges behave in line with the in dubio pro reo-principle.  p1 p is below one in
all of our nine cases, and ranges from a minimum as small as 0:03 to a maximum of 0:5.
Summing up, the descriptive statistics on judges provides two insights: First, judges respond to the
exogenous variables as predicted by Proposition 1 as both higher noise (q) and higher nes (F ) reduce the
punishment frequency. Second, judges care far more about type-I compared to type-II errors.
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Violators. Similar to table 2 for judges, table 3 displays the stealing behavior of violators. The rst three
lines can be interpreted analogously to those for judges: The number in the rst (second) line is the frequency
(percentage) of violations. The numbers in the third line are calculated as   p(1 q)FA . The term in the
numerator is the dierence between the expected punishment, with and without violation, for the actual
behavior of judges. The term in the denominator is simply the amount stolen. For instance,  = 0:11 for
q = 50% and F = 1200 means that the increase in the expected ne when a participant steals amounts to
only 11% of the amount stolen. Recall from the model that risk-neutral violators who anticipate the judges'
decisions correctly steal whenever 1   m   . In other words, everyone who is risk-neutral and puts less
than 1  0:11 = 0:89 weight on donation relative to his own payo should steal.
In all nine cases,  is below one, so that risk-neutral participants who do not care about donation should
always steal. Given that we nd, aggregated over all nine cases,  = 0:22 and a violation percentage of 0:55,
it follows that many potential violators have strong social preferences or aversion against violating social
norms. This impression is reinforced by the observation that the violation frequency is only around 60% for
the two cases in which the ne is weakly below the amount that can be stolen.
We now consider in greater detail the impact of noise q on the violation frequency , and then turn to the
ne size F . Recall that the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium predicts that  increases in q. For all ne sizes, the
expected rise in the punishment when a participant steals, p (1  q)F , decreases in q to a large degree. Thus,
in line with the prediction from the model, the stealing incentive increases in the signal's noise, even when
taking the actual punishment behavior of judges into account. This is conrmed for the dierences between
q = 10% and q = 50% and the dierence between q = 10% and q = 90% (signicant at the 1%-level in a
Fisher exact test), but not so for the dierence between q = 90% and q = 50% which is insignicant. This
insignicance is driven by the fact that, for the intermediate ne size of F = 2400, the stealing frequency is
higher for q = 50% than for q = 90%.
Considering the ne size, we observe a considerable deterrence eect of the highest ne F = 4800 in a
Fisher exact test, but no signicant dierence between F = 1200 and F = 2400. This holds not only on
average, but also for all levels of q, that is, violators on average basically do not care whether the ne is 1200
or 2400.
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Table 3. Stealing-behavior of potential violators ()
F=1200 F=2400 F=4800 Average
q=10%
Frequency 106 101 68 92
Percentage 55% 53% 35% 48%
 0.19 0.39 0.79 0.46
q=50%
Frequency 120 127 85 111
Percentage 63% 66% 44% 58%
 0.11 0.23 0.20 0.18
q=90%
Frequency 125 115 103 114
Percentage 65% 60% 54% 60%
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03
Average
Frequency 117 114 85 106
Percentage 61% 60% 44% 55%
 0.10 0.21 0.35 0.22
Summing up, the descriptive statistics suggests that, on average, the participants respond to noise q
and ne size F in the directions predicted by our model. In the subsequent sections, we use more rigorous
methods to analyze the participants' responses to q and F . We will focus on two issues:
First, we are interested in the interaction of q and F , that is, how the impact of higher nes on the
participants' behavior is moderated by noise. To see the point, recall from table 2, that for instance the
lower punishment frequency for F = 4800 compared to F = 2400 holds only for q = 50%, but not so for the
other two levels of noise. The interaction of q and F can best be analyzed in regressions of the punishment
and stealing behavior, and this will be done in section 5.
Second, a closer look at our raw data reveals that there is a large heterogeneity in the behavior of
participants. We address this issue in two ways: On the one hand, we include personal characteristics
derived from a questionnaire (see below) in our regression analysis, to see whether these characteristics can
partially explain the observed behavior. On the other hand, we perform a cluster analysis to distinguish
between dierent types of participants (section 6).
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5 Regression analysis
Factor analysis on personal characteristics. To control for potentially relevant personal characteris-
tics, we asked participants to complete a questionnaire after the experiment. The questions referred to risk
attitudes, moral attitudes towards the violation of legal and social norms and to the willingness to punish.
These questions were tailored specically to this experiment and are listed in Appendix 3. We performed
a conrmatory factor analysis (see e.g. Jae-on and Mueller, 1978) which led to four factors used in our
regression analyses:
 The rst factor which we refer to as \attitude to risk" comprises three questions mainly regarding
nancial risk attitudes (willingness to invest into a mutual fund, gambling in a poker game, and
investing into a startup).
 The second factor which we denote as \moral attitudes" consists of three questions regarding honest
behavior (minor wrong statements in tax declaration, plagiarism, keeping a found purse with 200 Euro).
 Factors three and four are determined from a questionnaire on the determinants of why people follow
rules. Factor three comprises two questions measuring the impact of nes and consequences, and factor
four refers more generally to the degree to which people are self-responsible for their actions. A detailed
list of questions is provided in Appendix 3.
Regression analysis for judges. In all regressions, we control for order eects as it might inuence
the behavior whether the role as judge or as a potential thief is played rst. Reference category is "judge
rst", and reference category for gender is "male". We also include the personality factors just described
in all regressions. In the regressions in columns (1), (2) and (4), the reference category for q and F are
the intermediate values, that is, q = 50% and F = 2400. All coecients are marginal eects, evaluated at
the mean of the explanatory variable. Furthermore, we need to account for the fact that each participant
makes nine decisions as a judge. Since these nine decisions are correlated, we cluster our observations in all
regression on a subject level.
Table 4 shows results for a probit-model on the behavior of judges.8 In the rst two columns, we regress
8All results are qualitatively the same for logit-models.
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Table 4. Probit-model on behavior of judges
(1) (2) (3)
Age -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender = Female 0.057 0.058 0.057
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
 -0.168***
(0.028)
F = 1200 0.014 -0.029
(0.020) (0.039)
F = 4800 -0.076*** -0.252***
(0.019) (0.034)
q = 10% 0.075*** -0.015
(0.028) (0.044)
q = 90% -0.118*** -0.243***
(0.027) (0.038)
F1200  q10% 0.015
(0.053)
F1200  q90% 0.134**
(0.066)
F4800  q10% 0.290***
(0.062)
F4800  q90% 0.333***
(0.062)
More than 3 thefts 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.134***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Attitude to risk -0.029 -0.030 -0.029
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Moral attitudes 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.059***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Fines and consequences 0.032* 0.032* 0.032*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Self responsibility 0.054*** 0.054** 0.054***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Order = Thief rst 0.035 0.036 0.035
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038)
Observations 1728 1728 1728
One (two, three) stars denote signicance at the ten- (ve, one-)
percent level, respectively. All coecient marginal eects.
Standard error in brackets.
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the punishment probability only on variables which are not aected by the actual behavior of violators. In
line with the descriptive statistics, we nd that judges do not dierentiate between the low and the medium
ne size (the latter one is the reference category), but an increase from 2400 to 4800 reduces the punishment
probability by 7.5 percentage points. Given that the average punishment probability in the data is 35%, this
amounts to a notable reduction of about 21 percent. For q, we also adopt the intermediate value as reference
category, and our results conrm that judges reduce their punishment frequencies signicantly when the
probability that the money disappears, even when it is not taken by potential violators, increases. Overall,
judges respond in the direction predicted by Proposition 1.
When we add the interaction terms of q and F in column (2), we nd no dierence between q = 10%
and the reference category of q = 50% for the lowest ne, but all other interaction terms are signicant. In
particular, the negative impact of the signal's noise on the punishment frequency is most pronounced for the
intermediate ne level of F = 2400,
In column (3), the variable on the right hand side of the regression that we are mainly interested in is
  (1 )FqA , which is the ratio in the expected unjustied ne from type-I errors in case of punishment
to the unatoned theft from type-II errors in case of no-punishment, both calculated using potential thieves'
actual decisions. That is to say, the ne size F and the noise q, which are not explicitly considered as controls
in column 3, and the actual stealing frequency  are the determinants of . We nd that judges respond
signicantly to this dierence.
Some interesting results emerge for our additional controls. First, we have a dummy variable which
indicates whether a judge has, in his role as potential violator, stolen less or weakly more than three times.
We had no prior on the sign of this dummy: On the one hand, one might assume that those who steal more
often nd theft more acceptable, and hence punish less often. On the other hand, they might assume a
higher frequency of theft, which hence reduces the level of  that they expect. Controlling for other factors
such as moral attitudes, we nd that those who steal more often also punish more often. Furthermore, in
line with the intuition, those with higher moral attitudes and those who believe more in social responsibility
punish more often (recall the details for these factors described above). Older students punish less often,
and gender is insignicant.
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Summing up our ndings for judges, our rst and most fundamental result is that the punishment
probability responds strongly to the signal's noise and the ne size. Note that this implies that the ratio of
type-I and type-II errors cannot be treated as independent of these parameters, which is usually assumed
in the literature on errors in court discussed in the introduction. Second, the eects of q and F are both
in line with our model predictions where the impact of the ne size, however, is exclusively driven by the
highest ne. Third, the violation frequency in fact depends on the ratio of the undesired consequences of
type-I and type-II errors, that is, it is decreasing in . Fourth, we nd that those personal characteristics
that are most closely related to our setting are highly signicant as participants who believe in moral and
self responsibility punish more often.
Regression analysis for thieves. Turning to thieves, we again start by regressing the behavior on the
ne size F and the signal's noise captured by q, that is, we do not take the punishment frequency of judges
explicitly into account. For both q and F , the intermediate values serve as reference categories. The model's
prediction that the violation frequency increases in q is only conrmed for the comparison of the two lower
values of q, but there is no signicant dierence between q = 50% and q = 90%. As judges do, violators do
not dierentiate their behavior between nes of 1200 and 2400, but increasing the ne from 2400 to 4800
reduces the violation frequently sharply, by about 15 percentage points or 27 percent.
When we add the interaction terms of q and F in column (2), we nd no dierence between q = 10%
and the reference category of q = 50%, but both interaction terms with q = 90% are positive. Thus, the
impact of increasing the signal's noise from q = 50% to q = 90% on the stealing frequency is lowest for the
intermediate ne level of F = 2400, which matches the corresponding result for judges.
In column (3), we substitute q and F by  = p(1 q)FA , the ratio of the expected punishment with and
without violation for the actual behavior of judges in the numerator, and the amount stolen. Participants
respond strongly to incentives: an increase in the ratio of expected punishment with and without violation
reduces the stealing frequency signicantly.
Summing up, we nd that violators respond to the signal's noise and the ne size in directions as predicted
by our model. These results, however, are driven by the dierence between q = 10% and the two other levels
of uncertainty, and between F = 4800 and the two lower ne levels, respectively. Thus, only a particularly
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Table 5. Probit-model on behavior of thieves
(1) (2) (3)
Age -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Gender = Female -0.119** -0.119** -0.117**
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
 -0.330***
(0.062)
F = 1200 0.016 -0.040
(0.023) (0.040)
F = 4800 -0.160*** -0.231***
(0.025) (0.039)
q = 10% -0.105*** -0.145***
(0.028) (0.043)
q = 90% 0.021 -0.068*
(0.028) (0.040)
F1200  q10% 0.066
(0.042)
F1200  q90% 0.097**
(0.045)
F4800  q10% 0.049
(0.046)
F4800  q90% 0.158***
(0.041)
More than 3 convictions 0.110** 0.110** 0.109**
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Attitude to risk -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Moral attitudes 0.018 0.019 0.018
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Fines and consequences 0.046* 0.046* 0.046*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Self responsibility -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.065***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Order = Thief rst -0.048 -0.048 -0.047
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
Observations 1728 1728 1728
One (two, three) stars denote signicance at the ten- (ve, one-)
percent level, respectively. All coecient marginal eects.
Standard error in brackets.
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Table 6. Punishment and violation frequencies; disaggregated by individuals
Number of thefts or punishments per individual Frequencies (judges) Frequencies (violators)
0 20% 9%
1 9% 5%
2 10% 9%
3 26% 16%
4 6% 4%
5 11% 11%
6 11% 14%
7 2% 8%
8 1% 6%
9 4% 19%
low uncertainty and a particularly high ne deter participants from violation. Interestingly, self responsibility
is signicant in the expected direction, but moral attitudes are not. Similar to the regression on judges, we
nd that those who punish more often also violate more often. The stealing probability of females is by 11.9
percentage points or 20 percent lower than those of males, signicant at the 5%-level.
6 Heterogeneity of the participants
So far, we have restricted attention to the average behavior of judges and potential violators, but we have
not yet considered the individual behavior. Individual behavior is important for several reasons: rst,
participants may largely dier in the relative weight they put on type-I and type-II errors. Second, some
participants may behave more or less independently of q and F by stealing (or punishing) basically always or
never. Then, the low dierences in the violation frequency for dierent levels of q can potentially be driven
by the fact that many individuals do not adjust their behavior at all. Table 6 summarizes the individual
behavior of the participants.
The rst column captures the number of punishments and violations, respectively, per individual. The
second and the third column measure the number of individuals meeting these frequencies. For instance, the
bold "11%" expresses that 11% of all judges penalized exactly six times, and the bold "16%" means that
16% of all participants steal exactly three times. The table shows that 24% percent of all judges (20% of
punish never and 4% always) and 28% of all potential violators (9% steal never and 19% always) behave
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identically for all levels of noise and nes in our experiment.
To learn more about the dierences in the behavior of subgroups, we perform a cluster analysis. Based
on the nine decisions in their roles as judges and thieves, respectively, we adopted an average linkage cluster
approach which generates clusters based on the observations' average distance to each other. Observations
with the smallest average distance form clusters (see e.g. Everitt et al., 2011). Participants who punish and
steal either always or never form separate clusters.
Judges. The largest Cluster 1 (38.5%) consists of judges whose punishment frequencies are intermediate
and almost independent of the ne and the noise of the signal. They seem to deviate from this pattern
only where nes and noise are both high, in which case expected preference costs caused by type-I errors
are highest compared to those of type-II errors (see table 2 above) and, therefore, judges punish very rarely.
However, there is one observation that can't be explained by this argument: For the very highest levels of
ne and noise, judges in this cluster return to the intermediate frequency with which they punish for low
nes and noise.
The second largest cluster (24.5%) consists of judges who punish basically always for low q, frequently
for medium q, and never for high q. By contrast, their behavior is more or less independent of F . The large
impact of q indicates that these judges take q as a very good predictor for the stealing probability, that is,
they put low emphasis on the possibility that violators adjust their behavior to q.
The third cluster consists of the 20.3 percent of judges who never punish.
All other clusters are fairly small: Cluster 4 consists of judges whose punishment frequency is to a large
degree increasing in q, a behavior that is dicult to rationalize. The same holds for the 4.7% of judges in
cluster 5 who punish far most frequently for the intermediate ne level of F = 2400. Finally 4.2% of judges
punish whenever they observe that the money is gone. Recalling from table 2 that III is negative in all
but two cases, such a behavior can be rationalized when the weight put on type-II errors is (slightly) higher
compared to type-I errors.
Thieves The cluster analysis for thieves also leads to six dierent patterns. The largest Cluster 1 consists
of thieves whose behavior is in line with theoretical predictions: The higher the noise and the lower the ne,
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Table 7. Cluster analysis for judges
F=1200 F=2400 F=4800
Cluster 1 q=10% 28% 30% 34%
N=74 q=50% 31% 36% 5%
(38.5%) q=90% 35% 12% 30%
Cluster 2 q=10% 100% 98% 98%
N=47 q=50% 68% 62% 30%
(24.5%) q=90% 15% 2% 4%
Cluster 3 q=10% 0% 0% 0%
N=39 q=50% 0% 0% 0%
(20.3%) q=90% 0% 0% 0%
Cluster 4 q=10% 33% 27% 27%
N=15 q=50% 87% 100% 60%
(7.8%) q=90% 100% 100% 80%
Cluster 5 q=10% 0% 44% 11%
N=9 q=50% 56% 89% 44%
(4.7%) q=90% 0% 78% 33%
Cluster 6 q=10% 100% 100% 100%
N=8 q=50% 100% 100% 100%
(4.2%) q=90% 100% 100% 100%
the higher is the stealing frequency (with the exemption at the intermediate values of q and F where the
stealing frequency is 100%). Given the actual behavior of judges, this is also consistent with the regression
analysis which shows that the violation frequency decreases in the dierence between the expected ne with
and without violation (see table 5, column I).
The second largest cluster consists of violators whose behavior depends mainly on the signal's noise, in
the expected direction: The higher q, the higher the violation frequency. The dierence to the rst cluster
is that higher nes still reduce the violation frequency, but are far less important. In both of these largest
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clusters, however, violators respond in the expected directions on noise and ne sizes.
18.8% of the participants steal always (cluster 3).
The remaining three clusters are small: Cluster 4 consists of participants whose behavior can hardly be
rationalized, since the violation frequency is to a large extent decreasing in q, and because the ne size plays
basically no role. 8.9% of all participants never steal (cluster 5), and the behavior in cluster 6 is almost
completely driven by the ne size: These eleven participants (5.7%) almost always steal for low F , but hardly
ever for the two higher ne sizes.
Table 8. Cluster analysis for thieves
F=1200 F=2400 F=4800
Cluster 1 q=10% 72% 52% 17%
N=58 q=50% 95% 100% 40%
(30.2%) q=90% 100% 84% 66%
Cluster 2 q=10% 2% 22% 8%
N=50 q=50% 16% 46% 34%
(26.0%) q=90% 48% 56% 48%
Cluster 3 q=10% 100% 100% 100%
N=36 q=50% 100% 100% 100%
(18.8%) q=90% 100% 100% 100%
Cluster 4 q=10% 100% 100% 90%
N=20 q=50% 50% 50% 45%
(10.4%) q=90% 10% 10% 20%
Cluster 5 q=10% 0% 0% 0%
N=17 q=50% 0% 0% 0%
(8.9%) q=90% 0% 0% 0%
Cluster 6 q=10% 64% 36% 0%
N=11 q=50% 100% 0% 0%
(5.7%) q=90% 45% 0% 9%
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7 Conclusion
We analyze the impact of ne size and legal uncertainty on the frequencies of punishments and legal in-
fringements. In our theoretical model, we assume that legal decision makers have heterogeneous preferences
with respect to type-I and type-II errors, and that potential violators have dierent preference costs from
violating the law. Based on these assumptions, we rst derive the straightforward results that higher un-
certainty and higher nes reduce the punishment frequency when legal decision makers ignore the strategic
interdependency between their own and the violators' decisions (non-strategic behavior). Analogously, higher
uncertainty increases and higher nes reduce the violation frequency. Taking the interdependency between
the two market sides seriously, however, results turn out to be more complicated: higher nes still reduce the
punishment frequency and higher uncertainty increases the violation frequency, but the impact of the ne
size on the violation frequency and the impact of uncertainty on the punishment frequency is more involved
and depends on the parameters of the model.
We then conduct a laboratory experiment that accounts for dierences in uncertainty and ne sizes. Our
ndings are basically in line with the theory, and the following results are most notable: First, in their
role as judges, participants care far more about type-I compared to type-II errors which leads to rather
low punishment frequencies: The undesired monetary consequences of type-II errors are ve times higher
than those of type-I errors. This means that the average preferences of the students participating in our
experiment coincide with the principle of in dubio pro reo that is anchored in all legal systems. Second,
although the expected own monetary payo is always higher with stealing, the average stealing probability
is only 55%. We hence nd pronounced social preferences for donation or for compliance with social norms.
Third, the data reveals a large heterogeneity in preferences both in the role as a judge and in the role as a
potential violator.
Compared to the literature which treats the (relative) frequencies of type-I and type-II errors as exoge-
nously given, two of our ndings deserve attention from an applied point of view: First, when the signal's
noise represented by q in our setting, increases, then there are two detrimental eects on deterrence: The rst
eect is that both error types reduce the dierence in the expected ne with and without infringement, and
this sets higher violation incentives as analyzed in the traditional literature. In addition, however, judges in
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our experiment are less willing to punish in cases of higher legal uncertainty, and this indirect eect reinforces
the negative deterrence eect. Second, although the results indicate that the deterrence eect of higher nes
is likely to be overestimated when the countervailing eect via the lower willingness to convict a suspect
is neglected; precisely as emphasized by the old dignied legal literature on nullication mentioned in the
introduction.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
If S and Sm are intervals, e 2 S and em 2 Sm, then the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is given by the
solution to the system of equations
p = G


q(1  )
A
F

 = H

1  Fp(1  q)
A

:
The system of total dierentials is
0BBBB@
1  g(e) A(1 )2qF g(e) A(1 )qF 2 g(e) A(1 )q2F
h(em)F (1 q)A 1 h(em)p(1 q)A  h(em)FpA
1CCCCA
0BBBBBBB@
dp
d
dF
dq
1CCCCCCCA
=
0B@ 0
0
1CA : (7)
Hence, the comparative statics are:
d
dF
=
h(em)(1  q) (g(e)e  p)
A

1 + 1 qq(1 )2h(em)g(e) ; (8)
the denominator of which is always positive, so that the whole expression is positive if and only if
p < AFq(1 )g(e), which is, in equilibrium, equivalent to G(e) < eg(e), which is always satised if G(:)
is convex.
dp
dF
=   eg(e)
F

1 + Fp(1 q)(1 )Ah(em)
1 + eF (1 q)(1 )Ag(e)h(em) < 0 (9)
independent of the distributions of  and m.
d
dq
=
e
q g(e) + p1 qe
(1 )g(e) + AF (1 q)h(em) > 0 (10)
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independent of the distributions of  and m.
dp
dq
=  
g(e)
q
he  p(1 )2h(em)i
1 + g(e)h(em) 1 qq(1 )2 ; (11)
the denominator of which is always positive, so that we have dpdq < 0 if and only if
p
(1  )2h(em) < e: (12)

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Appendix 2: Translation of German instructions
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation! This experiment has
been nanced by researchers from RWTH Aachen, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and
Portsmouth Business School.
Please turn o your mobile phones and remain silent during the entire experiment. Any com-
munication between you and the other participants is not allowed. If you have questions, please raise
your hand. We will then directly come to your cabin to answer your questions.
The instructions are written using the masculine form only in order to improve readability. Please
understand this as being gender-neutral.
All of your decisions will be processed anonymously and cannot be traced back to you.
During the experiment all amounts will be presented in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). At
the end of the experiment the amount of ECU will be converted to Euro as follows:
75 ECU = 10 Cent (EUR)
You will receive a show up fee of 3000 ECU for participating in this experiment.
The experiment consists of two rounds. Your nal payment will be the sum of your payments
from all two rounds and your show up fee.
During the experiment you are allowed to use any tools such as paper, pencils or calculators.
After the actual experiment we will ask you to ll out a questionnaire. Please answer these
questions honestly. The answers to the questionnaire will not impact your payment.
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All participants have been randomly assigned to one out of two groups. You have been assigned
to Group 1. In your role you will have to take decisions, which do not have any impact on your payment
in the rst round. Your payment in this round will be 2400 ECU independently of your decisions.
Nevertheless we ask you to take this round seriously.
In round 1 the computer randomly assigns one participant from Group 2 to you. This partici-
pant will also receive 6000 ECU for participating in this experiment and 2400 ECU in round 1.
The experiment is as follows: For every participant in Group 2 (including the person that has
been assigned to you) we have provided a donation of another 2400 ECU to "Brot fur die Welt".
However, the participants in Group 2 have the possibility to steal this donation. In this case, the 2400
ECU will not be donated to "Brot fur die Welt". At the same time the payment for the participant in
Group 2 will be increased from 2400 ECU to 4800 ECU.
You will be able to see whether the donation of 2400 ECU is available or not. The only compli-
cation is that you cannot be entirely sure whether the money has been stolen by the participant in
Group 2: After the potential thief has decided about stealing the donation, the 2400 ECU can also
get lost by chance. The probability that the donation gets lost by chance will be varied but always be
public knowledge.
This means concretely: If you notice, that the 2400 ECU are not available for donation, you
cannot be sure whether the donation has been stolen or been lost by chance.
In case that the donation is not available (and only in this case) you can decide to punish the
participant from Group 2 that has been assigned to you. However, in this case you have to consider
that you might punish an innocent person. If you decide not to punish a potential thief might not get
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any a punishment for stealing the donation.
Please consider: In case that the money is still available we will really donate the money!
The punishments will be varied as well but also always be public knowledge.
You and the person that has been assigned to you will see the following table during the exper-
iment:
q/F 1200 2400 4800
10%
50%
90%
Following the lines from the top you see the probability q. This is the probability that the donation
gets lost by chance, even if the money has not been stolen.
Example: In the second line the 2400 ECU will not be available for donation with a 50% chance even
if the person from Group 2 has not stolen the donation.
Let us clarify this: Considering that the donation is not available, the probability that an inno-
cent person gets punished will be higher in a lower line (if you decide to punish).
Following the columns from the left you can see the dierent amounts of punishment. A punish-
ment of 4800 ECU means that 4800 ECU will be subtracted from the account of the other participant.
This punishment will only become relevant if the money is not available. For this case we ask you to
decide in which cases of q (probability that donation gets lost by chance if it has not been stolen) and
amount of punishment you want to punish.
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Before you ll out this table, please answer the following question:
Suppose you consider the probability that the person assigned to you steals with 20% probabil-
ity. You know that the donation gets lost with a 50% chance (q=50%) even if the money has not been
stolen. You then notice that the donation is not available.
How would you estimate the actual probability that the money got stolen? If you need a calcu-
lator please use the icon on the right. Please type in a value, even if you are unsure about your result.
Let us quickly sum up:
Assume that the donation of 2400 ECU is not available. Following the lines from the top you
can see the probability q that the donation got lost by chance (if it has not been stolen). In the columns
you can see possible punishments.
The participant that has been assigned to you has to decide whether he wants to steal or not
for every case. If he has stolen and does not get punished and receives a higher payment. If he has not
stolen but the donation has been lost by chance, you might punish an innocent person.
Round 1: Judge Please mark the cases in which you want to punish. You have to decide for
every case individually. A checkmark means that you want to punish, a blank eld means that you do
not want to punish.
Round 2: Thief In the following round you take the role of the participants in Group 2.
Apart from this, there are no changes in the experiment compared to round 1. You receive a base
payment of 2400 ECU in this round. A checkmark in the table now means that you steal the donation
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of 2400 ECU. If the random participant from the other group decides to punish you, the punishment
will be subtracted from your account.
Before the experiment begins we would like to explain how the actual payment in round 2 is
calculated. We ask you again to ll the table with all nine combinations of q (probability that the
donation gets lost, even if you decide not to steal) and the amount of punishment. At the same time
we will ask a person from the other group to decide in which of the nine cases he wants to punish if the
donation is not available.
For the actual payment the computer randomly selects one of the nine cases; each case with
the same probability.
Example: Assume the case with q=50% and a punishment of 2400 ECU is selected. If the do-
nation is still available, your payment will be 2400 ECU. If the donation is not available, there are four
possibilities:
(1) You have stolen and you get punished. Your payment then will be: 2400 ECU (base pay-
ment) + 2400 ECU (stolen donation) - 2400 ECU (punishment) = 2400 ECU
(2) You have not stolen but you get punished. Your payment then will be: 2400 ECU (base
payment) + 0 ECU (donation not stolen) - 2400 ECU (punishment) = 0 ECU
(3) You have stolen and you do not get punished. Your payment then will be: 2400 ECU (base
payment) + 2400 ECU (stolen donation) = 4800 ECU
(4) You have not stolen and you do not get punished. Your payment then will be: 2400 ECU
(base payment) + 0 ECU (donation not stolen) = 2400 ECU
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Please mark the cases in which you want to steal. You have to decide for every case individu-
ally. A checkmark means that you want to steal, a blank eld means that you do not want to
steal.
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire
Attitude to risk:
How probably would you decide to...
... invest 10 % of your yearly income in an open mutual fund with medium growth opportunities?
... invest your daily income in a poker game?
... invest 10 % of your yearly income into an entrepreneurial company?
Moral attitudes:
How probably would you decide to...
... state favorable yet questionable information in your tax declaration?
... declare someone else's work as your own?
... keep a found purse with 200 Euro?
Impact of nes and consequences:
To which degree do you agree to the following statements?
Whether people follow rules, depends mainly on the consequences
For many crimes punishment in Germany is too low.
Necessity of rules and regulation:
To which degree do you agree to the following statements?
The nancial crisis has been caused because risks were not disclosed and underestimated.
People should be held responsible for their actions.
Self-responsibility for own actions:
To which degree do you agree to the following statements?
Whether people follow rules, depends mainly on their character and their general living conditions.
Everyone is responsible for him-/herself.
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Donations are a relevant component to ght poverty and misery.
Fault of nancial crisis:
To which degree do you agree to the following statements?
The nancial crisis has been caused because bankers have taken risks on behalf of the community to
enrich themselves.
The nancial crisis has been caused because of bad regulation.
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